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26 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW
of administration. Its value may be nil,22 but it will serve for pur-
poses of administration. In one instance the wrecked auto (value
$50) fulfilled the asset requirement for purposes of administration.2 3
MARVIN DANSKY
DUE PROCESS-USE OF BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE
INTOXICATION NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
Following an automobile accident in which one person was killed,
D was taken to a hospital for treatment. While D was still in an
unconscious state, a hypodermic needle was used to extract five cubic
centimeters of blood from her. One cubic centimeter was used to
determine the percentage of alcohol in D's blood. The test results,
indicating intoxication, were admitted into evidence at D's trial for
manslaughter. On the ground that the subsequent conviction violated
due process, D appealed to the California Supreme Court. Held:
affirmed,' with two justices dissenting. The admission of such evi-
dence did not cause the conviction to fall under the ban of the due
process clause of the Federal Constitution2 as applied by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Rochin v. California.3
While the argument advanced by the defendant in the instant
case is not original, it has never before been given such extended
consideration.
4
Until the Rochin decision, the most frequently raised objections
to the use of such evidence were that the privilege against self-incrim-
ination was violated and that the security against illegal search and
seizure was invaded.5  The Rochin case, however, raised a further
'Cases cited note 5 supra.
'Power v. Plummer, 93 N.H. 37, 35 A.2d 230 (1943).
'People v. Haeussler, 260 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1953).
'U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
'342 U.S. 165 (1952). In this case suspecting the defendant of being in pos-
session of narcotics, state police officers broke into the defendant's bedroom. The
defendant promptly swallowed two capsules containing the incriminating evidence.
After an unsuccessful attempt to recover the evidence from the defendant's mouth,
the officers used force and retrieved the evidence by use of a stomach pump. The
Court held that the use of this evidence to convict the defendant violated due pro-
cess. See 24 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 386 (1952).
'See State v. Smith, 91 A.2d 188 (Del. 1952), and Justice Moore's dissenting
opinions in Kallnbach v. People, 125 Colo. 144, 166, 242 P.2d 222, 234 (1952) and
in Block v. People, 125 Colo. 37, 44, 240 P.2d 512, 516 (1951), rehearing denied
(1952), indicating that the argument was urged, although the majority opinions
failed to consider it.
'See People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App.2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948); Kallnbach v.
People, 125 Colo. 144, 242 P.2d 222 (1952) ; Block v. People, 125 Colo. 37, 240 P.2d
512 (1951); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945); Apodaca v. State,
140 Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940).
Although the defendant in the instant case apparently did not argue the ques-
tions of self-incrimination and illegal search and seizure, the California court con-
sidered them and concluded (1) that such evidence, not being a testimonial
utterance, could not be deemed self-incriminating, and (2) that even if the evidence
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question, namely, whether or not the use of such evidence would
constitute a denial of due process." The defendant's argument in the
instant case, which would resolve this question in the affirmative, is
not without merit 7 for the applicability of the Rochin rule would
appear to be essentially a matter of degree.
Prior to the Rochin case, the United States Supreme Court had
maintained a consistent policy of leaving the regulation of state police
officers in securing evidence almost exclusively to the state courts.8
Except in cases of coerced confessions, the Court made no attempt
under the Fourteenth Amendment9 to supervise state police activity as
closely as it regulated federal police activity under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.' 0 However, in several of the coerced confession
cases, the Court indicated that the use of coerced confessions as
evidence was objectionable not only because of their unreliability, but
also because of the offensive tactics utilized by the state police officers
in procuring them." The Court's rejection of the evidence in Rochin
v. California was clearly based on this latter objection,' 2 for the relia-
bility of the evidence used against the accused could not be questioned.
The Rochin decision seemed to indicate that the Court intended to
subject to its review the procedures of state police officers in acquiring
evidence from the body of an accused.
13
were obtained by an illegal search and seizure, it is, notwithstanding, admissible
under California law without violating the due process clause, citing Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'See, e.g., Doyle, Blood, Whiskey and the Constitution, 24 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
459 (1952).
'On the facts as presented, the California court would have had to reverse
had the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Rochin v. California been
that of the majority. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 179 (1952).
'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
Cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944). The same policy prevails as to state
criminal prosecutions generally. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
OU.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
"Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) with Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). Steadfastly, the Court has rejected the argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights and make
their commands equally binding upon the states. Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
The supervision over police procedures, state or federal, is not direct. Rather
it is the ultimate result of supervision over trial court procedures in general. See
note 8 supra.
"See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952) ; Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401, 404 (1945); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). It would
appear that the Court has rejected this rationale in the recent case of Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). To the extent that the Court has rejected it, the
policy of the Court would appear to be inconsistent with the decision in the
Rochin case.
"Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
"The language of the California court in the principal case seems to suggest a
different conclusion: "Contrary to ... [the defendant's] ... contention, the Rochin
opinion does not rest upon the premise that the taking of evidence from the person
of a defendant or by entry into his body is the decisive factor." People v. Haeussler,
260 P.2d 8, 12 (Cal. 1953). It is submitted that the court is using the word
"decisive" with reference to a reversal but not with reference to a review; that is,
the United States Supreme Court may review but will not necessarily reverse.
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To paraphase the majority opinion in the Rochin case, the test
for determining whether the admission of evidence obtained from the
body of the accused violates due process is whether or not the tactics
used by the state police officers in obtaining such evidence are brutal
and offensive to human dignity.1 4 In construing the Rochin opinion
in the instant case, the California court adopted this view. The court
did not expressly preclude the applicability of the Rochin rule to all
blood tests for determining intoxication. 15 Rather it indicated that
it would be a question in each particular case whether the means
employed to obtain the evidence were or were not brutal.
On the facts presented to the court in the instant case, it was
unable to see why taking blood from an unconscious person would
constitute a brutal act.1" If the defendant had been conscious and
expressed objection with the result that force had to be applied, the
court would have been confronted with a far more difficult problem.
While the test as adopted by the California court is necessarily
vague, in the light of the facts and the language of the United States
Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, it would appear to be sound.17
It is also probable that the test will become more clearly defined and
limited as new fact situations are presented to the United States
Supreme Court.' s More significant perhaps is the fact that state
courts have been compelled to scrutinize and review certain police pro-
cedures which they have heretofore allowed to persist with little more
than a word of condemnation.' 9 And, although the dividing line be-
ween brutal and non-brutal acts is indeed nebulous, it is not so inarti-
culate as to render the rule of the Rochin case unworkable. At worst,
the principle case aptly illustrates that although the case of Rochin v.
California may well be a landmark in constitutional law, it will be a
constant source of argument for many years to come.
HOWARD KLEMME
"The Court concluded: "We therefore put to one side cases which have arisen
in the State courts through use of modern methods and devices for discovering
wrongdoers and bringing them to book. It does not fairly represent these decisions
to suggest that they legalize force so brutal and so offensive to human dignity in
securing evidence from a suspect as is revealed by this record." Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
21This would be apparent from the following language: "The taking of a blood
test, when accomplished in a medically approved manner, does not smack of
brutality." People v. Haeussler, 260 P.2d 8, 12 (Cal. 1953) (italics added).
"5It is interesting to note that four cubic centimeters of the blood taken from
the defendant were used to type the blood for a transfusion. People v. Haeussler,
260 P.2d 8, 10 (Cal, 1953).
'See note 14 supra. The language quoted therein might well have justified
a holding by the California court in the principal case that the Rochin rule was
not intended to apply to blood tests for determining intoxication at all. See Doyle,
Blood, Whiskey and the Constitution, 24 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 459 (1952).
"SSuch has been the history of the rule forbidding the use of coerced con-
fessions. See cases cited in note II supra; and Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) ;
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
"See, e.g., California v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App.2d 140, 225 P.2d 1 (1950),
hearing denied 101 Cal. App.2d 140, 225 P.2d 913 (1951).
